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IN SEARCH OF THE MARKET'S MORAL LIMITS:
LIBERALISM, PERFECTIONISM, AND "THE
BAD MAN" IN CHRISTIAN
PERSPECTIVE
William Joseph Wagner*
In a world of but few moral verities, Judge Richard Posner and
others pursuing the economic approach to law have introduced a
normative principle into discussions of law and policy that receives
very wide currency. They propose that society should always sanc-
tion market exchanges, as a means of maximizing wealth, unless
some exceptional normative commitment on society's part requires
otherwise.1 Where the principle reigns, nonmarket values are
treated as restrictions on individual autonomy requiring special
justification.2
As a consequence, the justifiability of restricting market free-
dom becomes a standard mode of framing normative issues. Dis-
agreements about values are formulated as disputes over whether
contracts should be enforced. Arguments are made for and against
enforcing contracts for the purchase and sale of votes, the in-
tervivos transfer of eyes or kidneys, addictive recreational drugs,
enslavement or prostitution, and environmental purity.
3
Members of the liberal tradition in one or another of its
strands are most at home with this impact of law and economics.
Libertarians, like Robert Nozick, glide between descriptive and
normative uses of the postulates of neoclassical economics. They
would generally limit the market only to save it.4 Liberal egalitari-
ans like John Rawls add only equality in distribution of wealth to
* Associate Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, Columbus
School of Law.
1. Anthony T. Kronman and Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Contract Law 4
(Little Brown, 1979).
2. Id.
3. For example, Elizabeth M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the
Baby Shortage, 7 J Legal Stud 323 (1978); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the
Theory of Property Rights, 85 Colum L Rev 931 (1985); and Robert N. Stavins, "Toward a
New Era of Environmental Policy," in Carol Tucker Foreman, ed, Regulating for the Future:
The Critical Balance 133-173 (Center for National Policy Programs, 1991).
4. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 155-64 (Basic Books, 1974).
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the values of autonomy and efficiency which law and economics
generally assumes.
Most liberals, of course, publicly affirm other values in pockets
of ad hoc concern. But they are hard put to say why these secon-
dary values should trump liberty, equality and efficiency. Chris-
tians, whether liberals or not, profess substantive moral values by
reason of their faith which cannot be reduced to this triad of val-
ues. Those Christians espousing liberalism find it hard to justify
their substantive moral convictions. But the same is, perhaps,
equally true of those not personally espousing liberal philosophy.
The normative application of the economic approach to law
gains much in general plausibility from a more fundamental para-
digm dominating our culture. This often subliminal reality, which
may be called the 'paradigm of liberalism,' tilts the normative de-
bate through hidden assumptions in ways generally unfavorable to
arguments for the legal sanction of substantive moral values.
The formulation of normative issues in our current legal cul-
ture as often as not takes the form of asking whether voluntary
transactions of a given kind should be restricted. Assuming that
Christians and others concerned with advancing substantive,
nonmarket values cannot alter this trend, the question arises how
they can participate in the debate, so formulated, without adopting
premises dooming their own arguments; or, worse, confusing their
moral stance.
To avoid these outcomes, Christians and others must con-
sciously adopt an alternate orientation to law and values as a basis
for arguments for or against limiting given kinds of market transac-
tions. That orientation's meaningful statement must include a con-
trast with liberalism. Because liberalism gains a good part of its
energy from the rejection of a sort of antitype of reasoning about
law which may be called the 'paradigm of classical perfectionism,'
the contrast, to be complete, must describe, as well, the relation of
the alternative to classical perfectionism.
The orientation to law and values which can sustain specifi-
cally Christian arguments for, and against, the restriction of market
exchanges requires reference to authentically Christian theological
principles and values. It requires, equally, that such principles and
values be set in profile against the assumptions of both liberalism
5. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 302-03 (Harvard U Press, Belknapp Press, 1971).
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and classical perfectionism. This essay aims to provide such a
statement of the relevant Christian orientation to law and values.
METHOD
In order to derive and to contrast the dominant paradigm, its
antitype, and the Christian vantage, we can productively use a liter-
ary device on which three respective authors - Holmes, Plato, and
John the Evangelist - rely in parallel fashion, to facilitate a com-
pact imaginative grasp of divergent structures of reasoning. Com-
paring one recurring image allows the deft alignment of three
moral perspectives on law, and at once brings to light the precise
nature of the distinctively Christian proviso to the dominant
paradigm.
The literary figure I will employ for this purpose is best intro-
duced as it appears in Oliver Wendell Homes, Jr.'s essay The Path
of the Law.6 Holmes is in many ways the archetype of modern
American legal consciousness. His essay, published in the Harvard
Law Review in 1897, is a classic of American jurisprudence. It of-
fers a vivid statement of the liberal paradigm as it was moving into
its full ascendancy in American legal consciousness. The essay re-
lies upon one of the most famous literary devices in American ju-
risprudence: an invitation to assume the point of view of the 'bad
man.'
7
Plato is Holmes' counterpart as archetype with respect to the
perfectionism that troubles liberalism's dreams. Intriguingly, Plato
seeks to capture his readers' imaginations for his paradigm of
moral reasoning about law in the second book of the Republic,
with his own invitation to assume the viewpoint of the 'bad man'-
the possessor of the Ring of Gyges. 8 An analogous device, taken
from a central exposition of Christian principles to elicit the Chris-
tian meaning of the contrast between liberalism and classical
perfectionism and establish the distinctively Christian vantage on
both, is the woman caught in adultery in the Gospel of St. John-
the story of the 'bad woman,' as I shall, for equality's sake (how-
ever unfairly) call her for now.9
6. 'Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv L Rev 459 (1897).
7. Id.
8. The Republic of Plato 37 (Basic Books, Allan Bloom trans, 1969). I am grateful to
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The New Testament, unlike the writings of Holmes and Plato,
does not contain a theory of jurisprudence. Still, juxtaposing
Holmes and Plato with St. John's tale allows an alignment and con-
trast of their ideas with core Christian attitudes, values and beliefs,
suggesting the stance of Christian thought vis-A-vis the other two
paradigms. More concretely, these jurisprudential images offer di-
rection for moral arguments from Christianity for and against legal
limits on market transactions.
HOLMES AND THE PARADIGM OF LIBERALISM
In his essay, Holmes champions liberalism over perfectionism,
conscious that he is asking the American legal establishment to rat-
ify a transition in paradigms in moral reasoning about law. He in-
ducts the reader into the new paradigm by proposing, in an oft-
cited passage, that the reader adopt the viewpoint belonging to a
'bad man:'
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at
it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences
which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one,
who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or
outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience."
In the context of the argument, the bad man's attention to means
and ends, unrelated to broader contexts of meaning or value, func-
tions as an extended metaphor aimed at conveying an imaginative
grasp of the efficiency-oriented approach Holmes proposes to sub-
stitute for an older duty-centered perspective. The device's "cyni-
cal acid"'1 strips away conceptions of moral value Holmes holds to
be no longer tenable.
Holmes draws two lessons for law from the bad man's mental-
ity. First, the state, like the bad man, pursues ends formally intelli-
gible because they are willed by the power wielder. The law cannot
appeal to moral obligation for justification because reliable norma-
tive direction does not exist in "oughts" discoverable in the nature
of things. The law's instrumental character does not derive as a
mere behaviorist response to recalcitrance. It flows from the elec-
tive nature of the law's ends. In this view, one reasons normatively
about law by simply positing the ends society elects and asking
whether the law's benefits and burdens advance them effectively.
10. Holmes, 10 Harv Law Rev at 459 (cited in note 6).
11. Id at 462.
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The value of any one end is assessed in relation to its cost for
others. Normative reasoning about law is principally about effi-
ciency. Holmes sees "economics" as the future of jurisprudence.
12
Second, Holmes sees the bad man as modeling individual
choice. Holmes himself "much of" the bad man's "mind."' 3 The
man turns out not to be reprehensible; far from it, Holmes hints
that he is to be emulated, at least within unstated limits. Freed
from anxiety about "the vaguer sanctions of conscience," the man
can pursue his individual ends as a rational society does, matching
means to ends and calculating the opportunity costs of each. When
some deliberate ambiguity on Holmes' part is peeled away, the bad
man emerges as the rational decision maker.
14
In some of his more cynical moments, Holmes seems to reduce
all categories, including moral ones, to a will to power. 15 Yet, he
does not mean to say that law and morality are unrelated (in fact,
he terms law "the witness and external deposit of our moral
life").16 Holmes grants that the content of law varies with the mo-
rality of society. He expects some of the reasons given for societal
preferences to have the form of moral conviction. His individual
decision maker, moreover, where truly rational, conformsto social
expectations for the sake of material benefits under law. These ex-
pectations are, at times, moral in nature.
The point relevant here is that Holmes' voluntarism admits
such moral content into jurisprudential consideration only in
formal terms of state and individual election. Moral convictions,
individual or societal, are what we would term noncognitive prefer-
ences rationally indistinguishable from any other wishes. Holmes'
voluntaristic view of law and values makes the enforcement of
market -transactions valuable as a means of advancing both soci-
ety's and the individual's elected goals. For society, human in-
stincts, given empirically, ensure that free and enforceable market
exchanges generate wealth, not only for individuals but for the
group. For the individual, the market facilitates the acquisition of
12. Id at 472.
.13. Id at 461.
1,4. Id.
15. Holmes says, for example, "The object of ambition, power, generally presents itself
nowadays in the form of money alone. Money is the most immediate form, and is a proper
object of desire .... But ... the most far-reaching form of power is not money, it is the
command of ideas." Id at 478.
16. Id at 459.
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material advantages towards his or her elected goals, through
trades with others.
17
In his famous dissent in Lochner v. New York, 18 Holmes de-
nies a fundamental right to contract beyond the power of public
restriction. His statement of the liberal paradigm, thus, leaves
room for restricting market freedom. Since he reasons that the
market's value is only as profound as society's election of it as an
end, the law may prefer other goals to the market wherever the
public is persuaded a reason exists. The state's preference can pre-
empt the individual's wherever state power dictates. Although lib-
erals often overlook it, statism inheres natively as a potentiality in
the liberal paradigm. The sole check Holmes recognizes on this
restrictive power of the state is instrumental. Human instincts,
seeking market expression as an empirical matter, may create inef-
ficiencies for society's nonmarket goals if they are thwarted.
Under foreseeable circumstances, given the instincts typifying
modern Western society, this reality ensures that the state will allow
considerable pragmatic protection for market freedom.
Holmes' frank admission of the legal limitations on market ex-
changes distinguishes him from libertarians and from law and eco-
nomics approaches like Judge Posner's. Even so, Holmes and
Posner agree that the state does not limit the market to make peo-
ple perfect in virtue or otherwise to safeguard the human good. It
does so only for contingent societal ends that are meaningful be-
cause they are elected. All ends can be reduced to preferences of
the will, either the individual's or the state's. Christian commit-
ments to substantive values, for example, translate into just an-
other set of willed preferences. Because Holmes, like Posner,
grounds the societal value of individual autonomy pragmatically in
the legal protection actually received by individual autonomy in
this schema is itself more uncertain than most law and economics
arguments acknowledge.
THE PLATONIC ANTITYPE
Considered as a matter of broad alternatives, the judges at
whose duty-oriented moral paradigm Holmes directs his "cynical
acid"'19 may fairly be classed as among those still espousing the par-
17. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 298 (Little Brown 1881).
18. 198 US 45 (1905).
19. Holmes, 10 Harv L Rev at 472 (cited in note 6).
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adigm of classical perfectionism which modern liberalism by its na-
ture rejects. In scanning the history of thought, one discovers
classical perfectionism's archetypical voice in Plato, that enemy of
the liberal order. Curiously, Plato sets out his paradigm of reason-
ing about law and moral values, in the second book of the Repub-
lic, through a variant of the same imaginative figure Holmes
employs put to an opposing purpose.
Plato, like Holmes, invites us to consider the bad man's view-
point. The invitation is to be found in the narration by Socrates'
interlocutor Glaucon of the story of the Ring of Gyges. Glaucon
tells of a shepherd who happens upon a tomb rent by an earth-
quake. He enters to find a sarcophagus formed like a hollow
bronze horse within which an incorrupt body lies wearing a ring.
The shepherd returns to the world with the purloined ring where
he discovers its power to make him invisible. Seeing the object's
use, he negotiates a place in a delegation to the king's household.
There, the ring wins him access to the queen whom he seduces. He
then murders her husband and takes the throne.20 Here, it ap-
pears, is Holmes' bad man who cares not at all for morality or the
vaguer sanctions of conscience but only for material consequences,
but who is, by chance, immunized against just these consequences.
Whereas Holmes asks principally what the bad man's case says
about law, and only secondarily, if at all, what it says about justice,
Plato asks what the bad man's case says about justice and then de-
fines law in relation to it. Plato's story of the ring reveals the na-
ture of injustice, and thus of justice, by exposing the end-state that
complete freedom from prudential concern with the requirements
of morality causes in an evil soul. In satisfying his desire to take
from others for himself without limit, the ring's holder violates the
human relationships which, if he had respected them, could have
given his soul integrity.
In the Laws, Plato sets out the character and quality of the
essential human relationships whose violation constitutes injustice:
reverential ties of origin with the gods and one's parents; bonds of
mutuality with other individuals; and links of organic social solidar-
ity in the community as a whole. Conformity with these, rather
than with extrinsic legal requirements, makes a man just.21 The
one who orders his or her desires for the sake of harmony in these
20. The Republic of Plato (cited in note 8).
21. Plato, Laws, Books IV and V in The Dialogues of Plato 484-502 (Random House,
B. Jowett trans, 1937).
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relationships is truly happy, even if he or she suffers every material
disadvantage for doing so.
The purpose of law, Plato believes, is to make citizens virtuous
by ordering their desires to what reason discloses that justice re-
quires. The law also aims, he believes, at the due order in social
relationships reason reveals as the objective measure of rightly or-
dered desire. For Plato the just man, not the bad, models rational
choice for the state and the reasonable person.22
When it comes to the role of Contract, Plato virtually reverses
the liberal paradigm's presumption for the unrestricted enforce-
ment of market transactions. He assumes that the instantiation of
justice and other forms of the good occur primarily through public
applications of law, rather than individual election. He clearly sub-
ordinates the market to society's organic whole. Even within its
sphere, Plato is suspicious of the market's stress on efficient means
over intrinsically valuable ends. The enforcement of market trans-
actions will be limited in this scheme as higher aims of governance
dictate. Plato believes reasonable insight can apprehend these
higher aims by attending to what perfects virtue in society and its
citizens.23
Liberal and Christian readers alike find it significant that Plato
says nothing to restrict contracts in slavery or many other activities
now conventionally viewed as offending human dignity. He de-
rives the intrinsic requirements of justice limiting individual market
freedom from the nature of organic social structures, overlooking
personal dignity and individual autonomy as primary
considerations.
THE CHRISTIAN RESPONSE: TAKING DIRECTION FROM THE
WOMAN CAUGHT IN ADULTERY
Liberals often imply that the liberal and classical perfectionist
paradigms are the only alternatives in moral reasoning about law,
and that they are mutually exclusive. They suggest that rejecting
any particular of liberalism entails opting into all aspects of Plato's
perfectionist model. Likewise, they offer that if one finds any as-
pect of the perfectionist model unacceptable one must capitulate to
liberalism. If it can be shown that a distinctively Christian orienti-





false dilemma. A distinctively Christian approach would be like
and unlike each of the other two options, and perhaps capable of
absorbing elements of both. Christian approaches to market free-
dom would be likewise nuanced.
To explore the issue, one may profitably turn to the New Tes-
tament analogue of the "bad man" developed by Holmes and
Plato: the "bad woman" as I have called her, whom the Evangelist
John describes as caught in adultery. The following reading of this
isolated passage, no less than the foregoing readings of passages in
Holmes and Plato, of course, presupposes a general set of beliefs
about its relation to the body of work from which it arises, which
can be acknowledged if not expressly developed in the scope of the
present essay.
The story reads as follows:
Then the[y] led forward a woman ... caught in adultery, and
made her stand . . .in front of everybody. "Teacher," they
said .... "this woman has been caught in... adultery. Now,...
Moses ordered such women to be stoned. But you-what do
you have to say about it?" But Jesus ... said ... , "The man
among you who has no sin-Let him be the first to cast a stone
at her." And he ... started to write on the ground. But the
audience went away one by one, starting with the elders, and he
was left alone with the woman still there before him. So Jesus
.. said to her, "Woman, where are they all? Hasn't anyone
condemned you?" "No one, sir."... Jesus said, "Nor do I con-
demn you. You may go. But from now on, avoid this sin." 4
To isolate the story's essence, one may begin by asking what
Plato and Holmes might see in the situation the Evangelist de-
scribes. It is not unfair to say Holmes would see a woman who
cares for only the material consequences of her actions, calculating
wrongly that she can engage in adultery without detection, or
rightly that, if caught, she can arrange her escape without punish-
ment. He might suggest that the case means that the law on adul-
tery must be recast to state that a conviction will occur, in the legal
system in question, only where the accused cannot shame the judge
and jurors through counter accusation.
Plato, for his part, logically would see a bad woman who,
caught without a Ring of Gyges, has been made visible in the injus-
tice of her adultery. Having destroyed the intrinsic due order of
her relationships to others by her choice, she stands to receive a
24. John 8:2-11.
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sentence calculated to restore that order as far as possible. Jesus'
intervention would seem to have the shady purpose of returning
her to invisibility. When the crowd disappears, she is again unseen,
isolated from social responsibility. Perhaps Plato might suggest
that, on the facts of the case, the law should also expand or alter
the scope of its sanctions, injustices having apparently been
brought to light as well in the souls of the accusers.
The elements in the -story which these non-Christian interpre-
tations overlook help to isolate the story's specifically Christian
meaning and to expose the two foregoing accounts as misreadings.
Although specifically Christian, the meaning which emerges from a
consideration of these elements, corresponds in some respects to
tenets of liberalism, and in others to beliefs of perfectionism. It
can be articulated in terms of neither alone, but, helpfully, can be
described by comparison and contrast with both.
First, the apparent parallels with liberalism of the story's dis-
tinctively Christian content can be noted. In saying, "Woman,
where are they? Has no one condemned you? . . . Neither do I
condemn you. Go . . .," Jesus evokes liberalism's core assumption
by implying that the freedom from public condemnation entails a
sort of internal license as well. The woman is free to "do her own
thing" and go her own way.
The dispersal of the woman's accusers following Jesus' words,
"'Let the one among you who is without sin be the first to throw a
stone at her,' " establishes the universality of sin, thus further jeop-
ardizing Plato's perfectionist enterprise. The incident introduces
doubt, akin in its own way to liberalism's, into the notion that soci-
ety can enforce inherent requirements of true mutuality and jus-
tice. For Christianity, the historical character of human existence
creates a prelude to every action, making the equitable assignment
of guilt difficult at best. The universality of fault introduces an ele-
ment of justifiable doubt into the possibility of judging others in
good faith. Whether anyone can, in equity, pull the lever on
Plato's enforcement of the intrinsics of justice is problematic.
The Gospel account stymies not merely the intrinsic justice of
the judgment in the particular case, but even the generic function
of executing the laws and perhaps even that of their enactment.
Holmes alleges that the natural right to contract cited in Lochner
masked self-interest and ideology.25 The Gospel writer brings out
25. Holmes, 10 Harv L Rev at 468 (cited in note 6).
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a political interest lurking in the woman's accusers' preoccupation
with marital rights and duties. The accusers are actually trying to
entrap Jesus for the sake of undermining him with the authorities.
By analyzing law in terms of the lawmakers' ends, means and rea-
sons, instead of the intrinsic requirements of justice, the liberal par-
adigm may better lend itself than does the perfectionist, at times, to
critiquing such corrupting motives.
Reversing the angle of critique, an important element dis-
tances the story from the liberal paradigm and brings it closer to
Plato's perfectionist views. When the circle of privacy has closed
around the woman at the story's end, she is not alone with a liberal
choice of whether, when, with whom, and at what costs to her other
goals she will commit adultery again; she is the companion of an-
other who admonishes her not merely to go, but to "go and avoid
this sin." The norm, "Thou shalt not commit adultery," found in
Plato, thus is present in her story as a norm of natural justice. The
several parallels drawn with liberalism falsify the story unless they
are offered with an account of this essential departure from liberal
assumptions.
In weighing the meaning of this agreement of the Christian
story with perfectionism on a key moral norm, it is acutely impor-
tant to see at least that the mode of application distinguishes the
respective views of law and morality. In John, the woman grasps
the norm not within a circle of human accusers, but veiled from
them ("he was left alone with the woman still there before him").
She appropriates it in solidarity with one who refrains from con-
demnation in an act of grace, love and forgiveness. She is restored
through a divine liberation from a past of sin and for a future of
grace, rather than by human sentence. Plato calls God "the mea-
sure of all things." The Evangelist, convinced of the Incarnation,
considers God's love for the human person, fallen but redeemable,
that measure.
The principle informing St. John's story, that is relevant to the
issues in normative jurisprudence of concern here, is the dignity of
the person, transcending the moral failures society may find in him
or her. A closely related value is the conviction that such dignity is
realized in a history which human institutions cannot fully contain,
either with respect to remote causes of behavior or action's tran-
scendent meaning.
Christian awareness of the need to respect God's transcen-
dence, and the human dignity mirroring it, in temporal efforts to
535]
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assess and remedy moral fault, is balanced by Christian confidence
that moral norms like that prohibiting adultery are, in fact, knowa-
ble and morally obligatory aspects of the good of Creation. The
acknowledgment of objective moral norms as correlaries of the
Gospel message is. apparent: in the New -Testament scriptures.
Even respecting a diversity of more specific emphases, New Testa-
ment writers share an understanding that such norms figure in the
inherited biblical tradition in a way that Old Testament dietary and
hieratic elements do not.26 St. Paul, who considers the question,
views such norms as accessible to humans, generally, apart from the
inspired tradition.27 The Christians of the New Testament period
and afterwards rejected antinomianism staking out opposing
ground.28
In the Christian view, such norms spring from the personal
and relational nature of human fulfillment envisioned by the Crea-
tor. This is the perspective which Pope John Paul II eloquently
renews in his recent encyclical Veritatis Splendor.29 Although class-
ical protestant sources offer cautions regarding distortions in the
understanding and application of these norms arising from fallen
human motivation, and the futility of attempts at rectifying one's
relationship with God through autonomous compliance with natu-
ral moral norms, they support the existence or accessibility to
human knowledge of binding moral norms, preferring, for theolog-
ical reasons, their biblical over. their philosophical articulation. 30
When we turn to the ends of the civil law, Christianity, like
Plato, finds that its root, at some level of generality at least, is. in
human nature as reason discloses it. For Christianity, of course,
this is reason enlightened and perfected by grace and biblical reve-
lation. Depending on the strand of the tradition, the ,role of grace
and scripture in contrast to reason in this context may be more or
less pronounced. In any event, such norms have generally been
recognized within the Christian tradition as extending to promise
keeping, and thus add a dimension to the meaning of the legal en-
forcement of contract which liberalism overlooks. The moral obli-
26. This distinction underlies, for example, the apostolic discernment occurring in the
evaluation of the practice of circumcision recounted in the Acts of theApostles. Acts 15:1-
29.
27. See, for example, Rom 2:12-16.
28. See, for example, 1 Tim 8:11; 2 Peter 2:9-22.
29. 23 Origins 18 (Catholic News Service, Oct 14, 1993).
30. Martin Luther, Secular Authority: To What, Extent It Should Be Obeyed in John
Dillenberger, ed, Martin Luther: Selections from His Writings (Anchor Books, 1961).
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gation flowing from promise remains a necessary proviso to
whatever accommodation Christians find they can and should
make with the liberal view of contract.3'
In other ways, however, Christianity's proviso actually runs in
the'reverse, attaching to uses Christians might wish to make, or
even to which some might have made in the past, of the ideas of a
Plato who seeks to portray the just society as an organic whole,
knowable and attainable by human reason within the scope of tem-
poral human action. Christianity, both as reflected in this Gospel
story and in the philosophical and doctrinal traditions associated
with it, is properly willing to describe the just society only in reli-
ance on a dynamic and transcendentally open concept of the com-
mon good, acknowledging that the individual person is a "part"
transcending the "whole."32 The destiny and dignity of the person,
in the Christian view, both has an essential social dimension and at
the same time transcends society and its purposes and obligations.
The Christian story of the woman implies, then, some support
for liberalism's skepticism about the intramundane enforcement of
ultimate moral values. Comparable in its own way to liberalism,
the Christian story says that the individual, for whatever mediation
Christians attribute to institutions of church and society, ultimately
reasons about his or her concerts good alone before God.
Although Christianity assumes moral norms can at some level
be commonly known as binding, it recognizes that even as the good
is pursued in common, it is nonetheless pursued from the perspec-
tives of diverse individual stories and histories radically open, sepa-
rately, and on another plane, both to grace and judgment. In the
societal relationships implied by concepts of individual, civil society
and the norms of justice, Christianity leaves, then, some scope for
the endorsement of pragmatic legal arrangements such as the en-
forcement of contract, functioning as an essentially liberal device.
St. Augustine speaks for the Christian tradition when he empha-
sizes that the mystery of redemption permits society to go only so
far in assuming a common framework of values as it regulates
transactions in temporal goods.33
With respect to limiting the enforcement of contract, whether
such enforcement were to be pursued out of "perfectionist" regard
31. Harold J. Berman, Conscience and Law: The Lutheran Reformation and the West-
ern Legal Tradition, 5 J L & Relig 177, 196-200 (1987).
32. Jacques Maritain, Man and the State (U Chicago Press, 1951).
33. St. Augustine, City of God, Book IX (Hafrer, Marcus Dods, ed, 1948).
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for promise keeping or "liberal" concern for the sake of pragmatic
redistribution of resources, the story of the woman does suggest a
necessary Christian qualification. The divinely created dignity of
the person not only provides reasons for enforcing contract
promises, it also establishes moral constraints on doing so, as it
does on the coerciveness of law generally. While the Christian ap-
proach to law and values declines the organic moral vision of social
order found in Plato, it nonetheless entails limits on the enforce-
ment of market transactions and even the voluntary fulfillment of
some of these, not simply as society so elects, as liberalism might
find acceptable, but wherever any essential aspect of human dig-
nity is at stake either for the person or for society.
Christianity calls for inalienability rules setting outer limits to
market exchanges. The Gospel story of the woman suggests, for
example, that the enforcement of any transaction depriving a per-
son of the capacity freely to choose and to act responsibly thereaf-
ter, that is, to "go and sin no more," whether because of self-
enslavement, contracted prostitution or intervivos transplants
harmful to the donor,34 would be prohibited.
The contemporary difficulty in finding public validation of re-
strictions on market transactions offending against individual
human dignity or the common good signals the need for Christian
independence from the culture's liberal basis. But, the gospel story
of the woman caught in adultery suggests that Christian thought
ought not unqualifiedly align itself with the perfectionist alterna-
tive. Christian theorists should balance valuable elements in both
ways of seeing the world.
The perspective of the Christian grasps true human fulfillment,
as a possibility "already but not yet" here.35 As between Plato and
Holmes, the "already" of Creation, especially where grace and bib-
lical insight enlighten reason, allows especially salutary connections
with Plato's way of seeing human reality. The "not yet" of a
human story and individual histories open to a dimension tran-
scending human institutions, revealing interpersonal and societal
exchange as occurring on a plane necessarily falling short of the
36parousia, can sustain explorations of worthwhile connections withthe liberalism of Holmes.
34. Rose-Ackerman, 85 Colum L Rev 931 (1985) (cited in note 3).
35. Rudolph Schnackenbrug, The Moral Teaching of the New Testament 185-96
(Herder and Herder, 1965).
36. Id.
[Vol. 11
535] MORAL LIMITS 549
Christians do not see the woman taken in adultery as a "bad
woman," but, with compassion, as like themselves, fallen, and ca-
pable of redemption. So, too, they might consider whether
Holmes, despite his protestations, really is not a bad man, but,
along with the system he helped to shape, is yet capable of
redemption.

